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We provide a critical review of the literature on early warning indicators of 
economics crises and propose methods to overcome several pitfalls of the previous 
contributions. We use a quarterly panel of 40 EU and OECD countries for the 
period 1970–2010. As the response variable, we construct a continuous index of 
crisis incidence capturing the real costs for the economy. As the potential warning 
indicators, we evaluate a wide range of variables, selected according to the previous 
literature and our own considerations. For each potential indicator we determine 
the optimal lead employing panel vector autoregression, then we select useful 
indicators employing Bayesian model averaging. We re-estimate the resulting 
specification by system GMM to account for potential endogeneity of some 
indicators. Subsequently, to allow for country heterogeneity, we evaluate the 
random coefficients estimator and illustrate the stability among endogenous 
clusters. Our results suggest that global variables rank among the most useful early 
warning indicators. In addition, housing prices emerge consistently as an important 
domestic source of risk. 
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 1. Introduction 
The recent economic crisis has brought the early warning literature back into the spotlight. In 
the several past rounds of the debate, this literature stream developed the concept of an early 
warning system (EWS) consisting of alternative early warning models (EWMs) that should be 
able to identify and warn against various costly events, such as currency, banking or financial 
crises. The EWS should be able to warn early enough for policy makers to be able to 
implement measures reducing the costs for the economy. Despite the noticeable progress in 
the theoretical and empirical literature on this subject in previous decades, the recent crisis has 
demonstrated that there is still ample room for improving the EWS. First, while initial studies 
tried to offer EWMs to warn against currency and balance-of-payment crises in emerging 
economies, nowadays the research interest has shifted towards financial crises in developed 
economies. Second, the credibility of the initial EWMs was not always sufficient for policy 
makers to take the warnings seriously, owing to poor noise-to-signal ratios. Third, current risk 
factors may be very different, in particular due to the rising prominence of global factors and 
the interconnections between market segments and countries. 
In this paper we construct a continuous EWM for a panel of 40 EU and OECD 
countries over the 1970–2010 period at quarterly frequency and sharing a common set of 50 
potential leading indicators. Unlike the discrete EWMs of crisis occurrence much more 
common in the literature, the continuous approach does not require expert judgment whether a 
crisis occurred. The continuous model is designed to capture the real costs to the economy, 
where the key measure is the incidence of crises computed directly from data to reflect output 
and employment loss and fiscal deficit (the latter is used to characterize countries’ propensity 
to prevent costly outcomes by debt accumulation). Although the real costs do not represent an 
immediate sign of an erupting crisis, they characterize better the ultimate measurable outcome 
for the economy. 
We contribute to the early warning literature both in terms of scope of the study as 
well as in terms of estimation methodology. First, while previous contributions focused 
mainly on emerging markets or several selected developed countries, we use a broad panel of 
40 developed countries, including the EU-27 over the past forty years. Second, we employ a 
number of advanced estimation techniques to build the continuous EWM. To our knowledge, 
most of them have not been applied in the early warning literature so far. 
In particular, we relax the common assumption of a fixed horizon at which the early 
warning signals are issued (a fixed horizon of two years is often used in the literature) and 
examine the dynamic linkages between crisis incidence and leading indicators within the   2
framework of panel vector autoregression (PVAR). Using a rich set of leading indicators, we 
classify them into three categories: ‘early warning’ (one to three years), ‘ultra early warning’ 
(more than three years), and ‘late warning’ (less than a year). We argue that proper accounting 
for the time lags of leading indicators is important for building an EWM. 
Furthermore, we contribute to the methodological aspects of variable selection for the 
EWM. While it is a common practice in the early warning literature to use all available 
indicators based on the authors’ judgment and/or theory, we refine the selection of leading 
indicators systematically using Bayesian model averaging (BMA). BMA is a procedure that 
selects a subset of the most useful leading indicators of crisis, from the set of all possible 
combinations of the potential warning indicators.  
Finally, we use dynamic panel estimation techniques to reveal the marginal impact of 
each selected leading indicator on crisis incidence. The earlier applied BMA procedure allows 
us to estimate this model after removing indicators that have not been found useful, while the 
previous literature keeps all insignificant indicators inside the EWM. We also relax another 
typical assumption used in studies dealing with cross-section or panel EWMs, namely, the 
hypothesis of common parameters. To allow for country heterogeneity, we employ two 
methods: the random coefficient estimator and the tests of stability among endogenous 
clusters of countries. The results allow us to discuss the sources of risks to macroeconomic 
stability and, in particular, to compare the role of national versus global factors. 
Our results show that the choice of time lead for each potential warning indicator as 
well as the choice of indicators that are included (all potential indicators or only the useful 
ones) matters for which factors are detected as the major sources of risk by the EWM. 
Nevertheless, the importance of certain factors seems to be robust across different 
specifications. We find that rising housing prices and external debt are important domestic 
risk factors for crisis incidence. We also find that while housing prices are a useful warning 
indicator for all clusters of countries, the role of external debt is not homogeneous across the 
sample. However, the main source of risk is represented by global factors, such as world 
credit growth and world output growth. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our design of the continuous 
model by identifying key lessons and challenges from the stock of the early warning 
literature. Section 3 describes our approach to the construction of the data set and shows some 
stylized facts. Section 4 presents the setting of the early warning model, including its main 
components, namely the optimal lag selection upon PVAR, the selection of variables 
employing BMA, dynamic panel estimations, assessment of model performance upon in-  3
sample and out-of-sample fit, and sensitivity checks. Section 5 outlines the main sources of 
macroeconomic risks. Section 6 concludes. Two annexes attached to the paper contain data 
description and selected empirical results. More detailed data descriptions and all results are 
available from the online appendix (http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/en/node/372). The content of the 
online appendix is listed in annex III to this paper. 
 
2. Early Warning Literature: Lessons and Challenges 
The recent financial crisis revived interest in the early warning literature among 
researchers as well as policy makers (Galati and Moessner, 2010; Trichet, 2010). The 
literature dates back to the late 1970s, when several currency crises generated interest in 
leading indicators (Bilson, 1979) and theoretical models (Krugman, 1979) explaining such 
crises. Nevertheless, it was only in the 1990s—the first golden era of the early warning 
literature—when a wide-ranging methodological debate started, including studies on banking 
and balance-of-payments problems (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996) and currency crashes 
(Frankel and Rose, 1996). This methodological debate served as a starting point for the 
current stream of literature that has been mainly motivated by the recent financial crisis. The 
early warning literature offers many useful lessons on how to approach the new generation of 
the EWMs. However, important challenges still prevail. In this paper, we attempt to tackle 
some of them, such as how to measure the crises, which countries to include into the EWM, 
how to find useful early warning indicators and how to select  time lags.  
2.1. Costly events 
There are different types of costly events, such as currency crises, banking crises, and costly 
imbalances, for example on asset markets. Although the ultimate goal of each EWM is to 
warn against these costly events, there is no consensual approach in the literature on how to 
define them. Systemic events are typically identified as dramatic movements of nominal 
variables, such as large currency depreciations (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999), stock market crashes (Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2010), and rapid 
decreases in asset prices (Alessi and Detken, 2009). These studies either assume that systemic 
events are costly in real terms, citing stylized facts from previous crises, or select those 
systemic events which subsequently burdened the economy with real costs. The costly event 
is represented either by one variable (Frankel and Rose, 1996), or by several variables 
combined into one index (Burkart and Coudert, 2002; Slingenberg and de Haan, 2011) with 
the use of alternative weighting schemes (equal weights, weights adjusted for volatility, or 
principal components). Alternatively, other studies specify costly events by directly 
measuring their real costs (Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003; Laeven and Valencia, 2008), such as   4
loss of GDP and loss of wealth approximated by the large fiscal deficits that are run to 
mitigate the real costs. Some studies look at variables representing both real costs and 
dramatic nominal movements (Rose and Spiegel, 2009 Frankel and Saravelos, 2010). 
  Another aspect of defining costly events is the scale of real costs or nominal 
movements. The scale can be looked at in either a discrete or a continuous way. The former 
approach, according to which crises are yes/no events, has been more common in the early 
warning literature so far. Real costs or nominal movements correspond to a ‘yes’ value when 
their scale exceeds a certain threshold (Kaminsky et al., 1998). Alternatively, the coding can 
be taken from the previous literature. Under the discrete representation of crises, two main 
empirical approaches commonly applied are the discrete choice approach and the signaling 
approach. In the class of discrete choice models, the probability of crisis is investigated. A 
crisis alarm is issued when the probability reaches a certain threshold. The originally applied 
binary logit or probit models (Berg and Pattillo, 1998) have been replaced with multinomial 
models (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006, Babecký et al., 2011) that extend the discrete choice 
from two (yes/no) to more states, such as crisis, post-crisis, and tranquil periods. Under the 
signaling approach proposed by Kaminsky et al. (1998), a crisis alarm is issued if the warning 
indicator reaches a certain threshold. The threshold can be defined based on the signal-to-
noise ratio to minimize type I errors (missed crises) and type II errors (false alarms). 
  Recently, continuous indicators of crisis have been proposed (Rose and Spiegel, 2009; 
Frankel and Saravelos, 2010) that allow the EWM to explain the actual scale of real costs or 
nominal movements without the need to decide whether the scale is sufficiently high to 
produce a ‘yes’ value. Another advantage is that continuous indicators do not suffer from a 
lack of variation of the dependent variable when too few crisis events are observed in the data 
sample. Moreover, there is no problem with dating the exact start and end periods of costly 
events, a problem that is difficult to overcome in discrete approaches. The disadvantage of 
this approach lies in its limited capacity to send straightforward (‘yes/no’) signals to policy 
makers regarding the probability of crises. However, in the case of discrete indicators poor 
signal-to-noise ratios can limit this capacity as well. 
  In our paper, we follow several recent studies and we build a continuous EWM. It 
does not rely on the discrete indication of crisis occurrence that, as our related research noted 
(Babecký et al., 2011), can be rather subjective.
1 For the purposes of the continuous EWM, 
                                                 
1 Babecký et al. (2011) construct a discrete EWM with crisis occurrence index that aggregates indices obtained 
from the survey of literature and expert opinion as the dependent variable. It is been noted that the academic 
studies often disagree whether a particular country had a crisis in a particular period. Moreover, the 
discrepancies are also common when the academic studies are confronted with expert opinion from national 
central banks that were collected by an ad-hoc survey.   5
we define systemic stress as an event that is costly for the real economy in terms of high 
output loss, high unemployment, and/or a high fiscal deficit (caused by fiscal expansion that 
mitigates the recession). We follow this approach since maintaining output and 
unemployment at their potential levels could be viewed as policy makers’ ultimate objective. 
Also, this EWM reduces to some extent the judgment necessary to define the dependent 
variable. Specifically, it captures the consequences of any type of crisis for the real economy 
so there is no need to decide ax ante which type of costly events to consider. By looking 
directly at real costs, we avoid the problem of measuring which tail nominal events were 
costly. Moreover, there is no need to decide whether the scale is sufficiently high to produce a 
‘yes’ value. The decision whether or not to act is left to the policy makers. There is one 
additional benefit of the continuous EWM. It supports policy makers in steering policy 
continuously instead of reacting only to very rare warnings issued by the discrete EWM. 
2.2. Countries in the sample 
The literature of the 1990s was concerned primarily with developing economies that 
had suffered from currency or twin crises (see, among others, Kaminsky et al., 1998; 
Kaminsky, 1999). The recent literature has focused on the identification of crises and 
imbalances for large samples of countries, including both developing and developed 
economies (Rose and Spiegel, 2009; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010). Alternatively, attention 
has been given to developing countries and emerging markets (Berg et al., 2004; Bussiere, 
2007; Davis and Karim, 2008) or the OECD countries (Barrell et al., 2009; Alessi and 
Detken, 2009).  
The assessment is typically done in a cross-section framework, under the assumption 
of homogeneity of the sample despite the fact that large samples of more than 100 countries 
are likely to form a rather heterogeneous group. Also, developing countries are not likely to 
be at the same level of convergence, and hence the homogeneity assumption might be too 
restrictive. The only exception is a set of studies focusing solely on the OECD group. In this 
case, however, the studies face the challenge of too few observed costly events in their sample 
(see Laeven and Valencia, 2010, to compare the frequency of costly events, such as currency 
crises and debt crises, in various countries). To sum up, there is a trade-off between a 
sufficient number of observed costly events and sample homogeneity. 
To our knowledge, studies focusing on the group of all EU-27 and OECD countries, 
for which the trade-off between observed costly events and heterogeneity is relatively 
favorable, and which are of more interest to European policy makers, are not available. 
Moreover, homogeneity tests of the sample—in terms of both indicators and their   6
elasticities—are quite rare in the studies using large samples. To reflect that, we build EWM 
for a sample consisting of EU-27 and OECD countries only, from which Malta and Cyprus 
were excluded for most parts of our analysis due to data limitations. In addition, to see how 
sensitive our results are to the homogeneity assumption, we employ several techniques, such 
as cluster analysis and random-slope modeling, which allow the estimated parameters for 
individual warning indicators to vary across countries. This approach might reduce the 
problems with finding at least some useful leading indicators reported by studies using large 
heterogeneous samples (Rose and Spiegel, 2009).  
2.3. Potential leading indicators  
There are three approaches to determining which variables should be included among the 
potential leading indicators. First, some studies survey theoretical papers to identify potential 
leading indicators. These theory-based studies (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) usually work 
with a relatively narrow set of potential indicators, but sometimes this set is enlarged to 
include various transformations of the same data series (Kaminsky et al., 1998). Second, more 
recent studies often rely on systematic literature reviews. They scrutinize previously 
published research for useful leading indicators and create extensive data sets by including all 
detected indicators, and sometimes also various transformations thereof (Rose and Spiegel, 
2009; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010). Third, some studies take all the variables available in a 
selected database and add various transformations. All of these approaches are subject to the 
risk of missing important potential indicators. Theory-based studies are limited in their search 
for indicators by a lack of theoretical models that are able to comprehensively capture the 
reasons for various types of crises and imbalances. Systematic literature reviews inherit 
various omissions from the surveyed research, unless they add indicators of their own. Studies 
relying on one database may miss indicators available elsewhere. Research that explicitly 
tackles the problem of non-available data series is very rare (Cecchetti et al., 2010). The 
recent crisis revealed that various financial indicators, such as liquidity ratios, might carry 
useful information regarding future costly events. Nevertheless, the data series needed to 
compute such indicators are not available, or are only available for some countries and limited 
time periods. For example, the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, credit to 
households, and the deposit-loan ratio for households are examples of variables that we could 
not include because of this problem.  
In our paper, we follow the second approach and rely on a systematic literature survey. 
Nevertheless, we strive to reduce the risk of missing important potential indicators from our 
analysis by adding potential leading indicators, such as the total tax burden and several global   7
variables, according to our own judgment. In addition, we combine several data sources, such 
as International Financial Statistics, OECD, World Bank, BIS, and NIGEM.  
2.4. Time lags 
The common approach to determining the time lags of potential leading indicators in EWMs 
is expert judgment. Most EWMs simply assume that the appropriate time horizon to look at is 
one or two years (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). This assumption is rooted in stylized facts 
that describe how important economic indicators develop in the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-
crisis period (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2010). The assumption is 
also related to the fact that most EWMs do not try to predict the exact timing of crises because 
it is a too complex task. Instead, they assess the likelihood of crises over a one-year horizon, 
given the currently observed values of all potential leading indicators.  
Such a fixed-lag assumption may be too limiting. Individual indicators may have 
completely different dynamics with respect to crisis occurrence, and so considering only their 
current values (and not lags) may yield suboptimal explanatory power for a given dataset. 
Therefore, we relax this assumption and we explicitly test for the optimal time lag for each 
potential leading indicator separately using panel vector autoregression (Holtz-Eakin et al., 
1988). Once the one-year lag assumption is relaxed, it is possible to distinguish between 
several horizons that might be of interest to policy makers. Specifically, we can see which 
variables issue a ‘late warning’ for a 1–3Q horizon, which ones issue an ‘early’ warning for a 
4–12Q horizon, and which ones issue an ‘ultra early’ warning for a 13+Q horizon. We try to 
focus on the early warning and ultra warning horizons, within which policy actions still have 
a significant chance to reduce the likelihood of costly events.  
2.5. Early warning indicators 
The EWM is constructed from potential leading indicators to give the best prediction of the 
dependent variable. Studies using the discrete representation of the dependent variable and the 
signaling approach usually evaluate each indicator separately by minimizing either the signal-
to-noise ratio (Kaminsky, 1999) or the loss function (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2008; Alessi 
and Detken, 2009). Alternatively, some studies combine potential indicators into composite 
indexes using judgmental approaches to select index components and computing thresholds 
for the corresponding variables simultaneously (Borio and Lowe, 2002). Both studies 
applying the discrete choice approach and studies using the continuous dependent variable 
work with a set of indicators that is also transformed into an early warning index (EWI). The 
weights of the potential leading indicators are estimated, and insignificant indicators (with 
zero weight) remain part of the index.   8
In the case of working with one early warning indicator, the challenge rests in 
choosing the threshold values above which the potential indicator (or composite index) should 
be used to form the EWM. The threshold values are determined ex ante by judgment or in line 
with previously published studies. Studies employing the discrete choice approach have to 
decide about the probability threshold. In the case of loss functions, a balanced trade-off 
between missed crises and false alarms has become the standard. Interactions between 
individual indicators pose another challenge. In the case of single-indicator EWMs, the 
information about interactions of indicators is fully omitted. Although policy makers can use 
several EWMs in parallel, there is a risk of underestimating the probability of a crisis if more 
indicators are close to, but below, their individual threshold values (Borio and Lowe, 2002). 
In the case of composite-index EWMs, this risk is reduced to the extent possible, given the 
empirical methodology chosen. In the case of multiple-indicator EWMs, it is often the case 
that the model is estimated and many potential indicators that are insignificant remain part of 
the model. Consequently, various biases may reduce the predictive power of these models. 
The resulting EWMs are typically assessed according to their out-of-sample performance by 
comparing one- or two-year-ahead forecasts with the actual values. For example, when 20–
30% of crises are predicted, the EWM may be considered well-performing. Also, traditional 
mean squared errors are used to judge the EWMs’ performance relative to naive models such 
as random walk. Sometimes the EWMs are also compared to a benchmark EWM selected 
from the available literature.  
Designing the continuous EWM we employ a methodology that, to our knowledge, 
has not been applied in the early warning literature so far: Bayesian model averaging (BMA). 
BMA allows us to select the best performing combination from all combinations of potential 
indicators (and their lags, as explained above). Subsequently, we estimate the weights of the 
useful indicators that are part of the best combination and create the EWI. This EWI does not 
contain insignificant variables. It follows that this newly proposed approach has several 
advantages. It reduces the problem of neglected variable interactions faced by studies working 
with each indicator separately. Also, it eliminates judgment from the process of creating the 
index from potential indicators. To test performance of our EWM, we employ the pseudo-out-
of-sample evaluation technique. Note that we understand our early warning indicators as 
being identified risk factors that make countries vulnerable to crises rather than variables that 
will be able to forecast the timing of the next crisis. This is in the spirit of the early warning 
literature (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) and also in the spirit of the very few practical guides 
to conducting early warning exercises (IMF, 2010).   9
 3. Data Set and Stylized Facts 
 
As outlined in the previous section, there is a certain trade-off in the early warning literature 
between country coverage, the time dimension, the choice of variables, and data availability. 
One unique feature of our data set is that it focuses on a panel of developed countries which 
are members of the EU-27 and/or the OECD. In total, the data set covers 40 countries, listed 
in Annex I.1. Another feature of our data set is a combination of a large time dimension and a 
rich informational content. The sample covers the period from 1970 through 2010 at quarterly 
frequency and includes the continuous indicator of crisis incidence and potential leading 
indicators. Most of the data come from commonly available sources.  
 
3.1. Crisis Incidence Index 
The Crisis Incidence Index (CII) is our continuous dependent variable which characterizes the 
consequences of any type of crisis for the real economy. Rose and Spiegel (2009) and Frankel 
and Saravelos (2010) use changes in GDP, industrial production, currency depreciation, and 
stock market performance to measure the incidence of the 2008/2009 crisis. We propose 
separating the nominal and real aspects and focusing on a real indicator of crisis incidence. 
Consequently, we construct the CII upon GDP growth, unemployment, and the fiscal deficit, 
by applying alternative weighting schemes. Since maintaining output and unemployment at 
their potential levels could be viewed as the ultimate objective of policy makers, a decline of 
GDP growth below, and a rise of unemployment above, the corresponding potential values 
characterize the costs for the real economy. The inclusion of the budget balance reflects a 
need to detect episodes where real costs have been prevented by fiscal deficits. Our definition 
is motivated by stylized facts according to which strong systemic events, such as the crisis of 
2008/2009, are indeed characterized by a decline in output, a rise in unemployment, and large 
fiscal deficits that are run to mitigate the costs of the crisis.  
The CII used in our analysis is obtained as a simple average of three standardized 
variables: the HP-filtered gaps of real GDP, the unemployment rate, and the government 
budget surplus (the series definitions and data sources are reported in the first three rows of 
Annex I.3). Real GDP and the budget surplus enter with negative signs to the average, so that 
an increase in the CII is associated with higher costs for the real economy. To take a country-
specific example, the CII for the United States is shown in Figure 1. The plots of the CII for 
all 40 countries of the sample are illustrated in the online appendix. We also tried different 
weighting schemes (for example, principal components), but the results are qualitatively 
similar.   10
 

































3.2. Leading indicators 
As a starting point for the selection of useful leading indicators, we identified over 100 
relevant macroeconomic and financial variables based on recent studies (e.g., Alessi and 
Detken, 2009; Rose and Spiegel, 2009; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010) as well as on our own 
judgment. We constructed a dataset covering 40 developed countries over 1970–2010 at 
quarterly frequency. Since for a number of countries the data only start in the early 1990s, the 
panel is unbalanced. In order to address the trade-off between sample coverage and data 
availability, as a rule of thumb we excluded series for which more than 50% of observations 
were missing. Moreover, some series were strongly correlated, differing only in statistical 
definition. As a result, our data set consists of 50 potential leading indicators listed on rows 9 
through 58 in Annex I.3.
2 The majority of the series were originally available on a quarterly 
basis, from the IMF’s IFS database. Some series were taken from the World Bank’s WDI 
database, available on an annual basis only. Such series were converted to quarterly frequency 
using the standard cubic match method. Fiscal indicators were collected from the NIGEM 
database. Property price indices were provided by the Bank for International Settlements and 
                                                 
2  Note that unlike some other studies we do not include among the crisis predictors any fiscal-policy-related 
variables. This is to avoid potential endogeneity as we use information on the on fiscal deficit to construct the 
crisis incidence index (i.e. the dependent variable of the regression).   11
the Global Property Guide. We standardized all variables
3 and used their stationary 
transformations; see Annex I.3 for details and data sources. 
In order to facilitate the economic interpretation of the leading indicators in the 
subsequent text, we divide the individual variables into twelve groups: for example, monetary 
policy stance, capital market situation, and global variables. Annex I.2 shows the groups of 
variables; the classification of the individual variables into groups is provided in Annex I.3.  
 
4. Early Warning Indicators in the Continuous Model  
4.1. Optimal lag selection upon panel VAR 
In order to set the horizon at which leading indicators send a warning of a potential 
crisis, the early warning literature commonly applies expert judgment. In our evaluation of the 
CII, we relax this assumption and perform an explicit test for the optimal time lag, employing 
the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) framework developed originally by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988) for disaggregated data with a limited time span and a larger cross-sectional dimension. 
PVAR departs from traditional VAR estimation in the sense that it deals with individual 
heterogeneity potentially present in the panel data. In particular, it allows for nonstationary 
individual effects and is estimated by applying instrumental variables to quasi-differenced 
autoregressive equations in the spirit of Anderson and Hsiao (1982). The specification of 
PVAR can be written as follows: 
  ,, , + it i it it Yf B L Y u    
where i stands for cross section and t time period,  , it Y  is a 2 x 1 endogenous variable vector 
´
,, , , it it it Y predictor CII    ,  , it predictor  represents each of the leading indicator, and the cross 
section heterogeneity is controlled for by including fixed effects  i f . Given that the lags of 
dependent variables are correlated with the fixed effects, forward mean-differencing (Helmert 
transformation) is used following Arellano and Bover (1995) to eliminate the means of all 
future observations for each variable-country-year combination. The estimation is performed 
by the GMM using untransformed variables as instruments.
4 While the optimal VAR lag 
length in a standard VAR can be determined by statistical criteria, this is not straightforward 
for PVAR due to the cross-sectional heterogeneity. Balancing the need to allow a sufficient 
number of lags given the nature of the EWS exercise and to try to avoid over-parametrization, 
                                                 
3 The standardization is done for each country separately and is carried out by subtracting the mean from the 
series and dividing the series by the standard deviation. Such standardization makes the regression results for 
each variable comparable, but does not affect the inference concerning the sources of risk. 
4 The Helmert-transformed variables are orthogonal to the lagged regressors and the latter can be used as 
instruments for the GMM estimation.   12
we set the number of lags to eight. The error bands are generated by a Monte Carlo simulation 
with 500 repetitions (Love and Zicchino, 2006). 
The advantage of this approach is that it allows for complex dynamics and accounts 
for potential bi-directional causality between the CII and potential leading indicators. We 
apply PVAR on the variable pairs represented by the CII and each of the 50 potential leading 
indicators available. Orthogonalized impulse-response functions are then used to determine 
the optimal horizon at which leading indicators warn about a crisis. Observing the response of 
the CII to a shock in each potential indicator, we set the lag of each indicator equal to the lead 
where the response function reaches its maximum with no prior on its response sign and no 
consideration of its statistical significance.
5 In addition, we allow for a minimum lag length of 
four quarters, assuming that a variable only provides an early warning if it predicts crisis 
incidence at least one year ahead so that timely policy action can still be taken. 
The impulse-response analysis determined the leads of all the tested variables between 
4 (our threshold value for a variable to qualify as an early warning) and 16 quarters. A full set 
of impulse responses for all leading indicators is available in the online appendix. To illustrate 
the lead selection logic, three examples of impulse responses are reported in Figures 2 and 3 
below. Each figure corresponds to the bivariate PVAR consisting of the CII and one selected 
leading indicator, specifically, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and house prices 
(HOUSPRIC). For the NEER we observe that the maximum response of the CII to a one-
standard-deviation shock to the NEER (an increase means domestic currency appreciation) 
appears within 3 quarters and is negative; i.e., domestic currency appreciation reduces crisis 
incidence, and currency depreciation increases crisis incidence correspondingly (Figure 2). 
Nevertheless, as noted previously we assume that a variable qualifies as an early warning 
indicator only if it points to a crisis at least one year ahead. Moreover, the negative sign of the 
CII response to a positive shock to the NEER suggests that it is rather a short-term effect in 
the run-up to the crisis. In particular, the fact that the domestic currency is on a depreciation 
path a few quarters before the peak of the crisis represents a late rather than an early warning. 
Consequently, for an early warning we make use of the other CII response peak with a 
positive sign (domestic currency appreciation implies in the long term an increase in crisis 
incidence) and we set the lag of the NEER equal to 12. The maximum response of the CII to a 
shock to housing prices appears within 5 quarters and is negative, indicating that an increase 
                                                 
5 The coefficient estimates and the impulse-response functions are conditioned on the variables included in the 
PVAR and, given the Choleski decomposition, also on the ordering of the variables. Given that PVAR estimates 
an elevated number of coefficients and there are numerous potential crisis indicators, they had to be included one 
by one. Nevertheless, the omission bias is in principle controlled for by including several lags of the CII, which 
arguably trace the effects of omitted variables. We tested ordering where the CII appears in the system before 
each potential crisis predictor but failed to find any different pattern.   13
(decrease) in housing prices reduces (increases) crisis incidence. In other words, housing 
prices start decreasing sharply before the peak of a crisis and can be potentially considered an 
early rather than an ultra-early warning indicator. 
We also performed alternative robustness checks such as estimating the model with a 
subpanel of G7 countries where the data series are longer, as well as excluding these 
countries, but failed to find any systematic differences in terms of the impulse-response 
functions. 
  
Figure 2. Impulse responses for bivariate panel VAR (NEER, CII) 
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Figure 3. Impulse responses for bivariate panel VAR (HOUSPRIC, CII) 
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4.2. Selection of useful indicators employing Bayesian model averaging 
As the discussion of the literature relating to early warning systems in Section 2 suggests, 
there is large uncertainty about the correct set of variables that should be included in a 
credible EWM. Consequently, there is a need to account systematically for this model 
uncertainty. In the presence of many candidate variables, traditional approaches suffer from 
two important drawbacks (Koop, 2003). First, putting all of the potential variables into one 
regression is not desirable, since the standard errors inflate if irrelevant variables are included. 
Second, if we test sequentially in order to exclude unimportant variables, we might end up 
with misleading results since there is a possibility of excluding the relevant variable each time 
the test is performed. A vast literature uses model averaging to address these issues (Sala-i-
Martin et al., 2004; Feldkircher and Zeugner, 2009; Moral-Benito, 2010). Bayesian model 
averaging takes into account model uncertainty by going through all the combinations of 
models that can arise within a given set of variables.  
We consider the following linear regression model: 
         X y    ~ ) , 0 (
2I                    (1) 
where  y  is the crisis incidence index,     is a constant,      is a vector of coefficients, and   
is a white noise error term.   X  denotes some subset of all available relevant explanatory 
variables X .  K  potential explanatory variables yield 
K 2  potential models. Subscript   is   15
used to refer to one specific model out of these 
K 2 models. The information from the models 
is then averaged using the posterior model probabilities that are implied by Bayes’ theorem: 
) ( ) , | ( ) , | (    M p X M y p X y M p                           (2) 
where  ) , | ( X y M p   is the posterior model probability, which is proportional to the marginal 
likelihood of the model  ) , | ( X M y p   times the prior probability of the model  ) (  M p . We 
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We elicit the priors on the parameters and models as follows. Since     and 
2  are 
common to all models we can use uniform priors (
2
2 1
) ( , 1 ) (

    p p ) to reflect a lack 
of knowledge. As for the parameters   , we follow the literature and use Zellner’s g  prior 
g M ,
2, |     ~ ). ) ( , 0 (
1 2      X X g N  Following Fernandez et al. (2001), the prior for g  is 
set as  ) , max(
2 K N g  . When choosing priors for the model space, we follow the advice of 
Ley and Steel (2009), who suggest using the Binomial-Beta prior. 
 The robustness of a variable in explaining the dependent variable can be captured by 
the probability that a given variable is included in the regression. We refer to it as the 
posterior inclusion probability (PIP), which is computed as follows: 
0






                            (4) 
Finally, since it is usually not possible to go through all of the models if the number of 
potential explanatory variables is large (in our case with 50 variables, the model space is 
almost 10
15), we employ the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Comparison (MC
3) method 
developed by Madigan and York (1995). The MC
3 method focuses on model regions with 
high posterior model probability and is thus able to approximate the exact posterior 
probability in a more efficient manner. The technical details of the BMA procedure can be 
found in Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009). 
To obtain the posterior distributions of the parameters we use 2,000,000 draws from 
the MC
3 sampler after discarding the first 1,000,000 burn-in draws. All computations are 
performed in the R-package BMS (Feldkircher and Zeugner, 2009). To account for any 
unobserved (constant) country heterogeneity, we perform fixed effects estimation.   16
Our dependent variable in the Bayesian model averaging exercise is the crisis incidence index 
as defined above. We use the whole sample of countries and include all of the 50 potential 
leading indicators described in Section 3. In addition, we include the fourth lag of the 
dependent variable in order to control for persistence of crises in time. In what follows we 
present the results for the main model when the lags of the variables are chosen according to 
the results of the PVAR discussed in the previous subsection.
6  
Figure 4. Inclusion of variables in 1,000 best models in exact lag dynamic specification 
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6 In principle, one could choose directly the appropriate lags within the BMA model but a number of issues make 
it unfeasible. First, since BMA weighs the models according to their fit and the number of variables included, it 
does not account for the potential multicollinearity of different lags of the same variable. Second, including a 
number of lags for each variable would yield an enormous model space even by model-averaging standards (e.g. 
including 16 lags of each variable would yield 2800 possible models). Third, one could also attempt to choose 
from the models where only one lag from each variable appears; nevertheless, to our knowledge there are no 
available off-the-shelf algorithms that would allow us to do this in a straightforward manner. The last reason for 
choosing the optimal lag length within the PVAR framework is that BMA would not allow dynamic 
interrelations between the variables. In addition, as sensitivity check we performed two more sets of BMA 
estimations, namely, when all the variables are lagged by three years, and when the lag length for all variables is 
set to six years.   17
In Table A1 in Annex II.1, we report for each indicator its posterior inclusion 
probability, posterior mean, posterior standard deviation, and conditional posterior sign (the 
posterior probability of a positive coefficient conditional on its inclusion). The correlation 
between the analytical posterior model probability (PMP) and the PMP from the Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo Model Comparison (MC
3) method for the 5,000 best models is higher 
than 0.99, suggesting sufficient convergence of the underlying algorithm. Out of the 50 
explanatory variables, 23 have a posterior inclusion probability higher than 0.5; we retain 
these variables. The results are discussed in more detail below, when we perform the 
frequentist check of the BMA exercises, but it is worth noting that all the global variables are 
important, which might be partly explained by the contagion effects and the worldwide nature 
of some crises. 
Figure 4 reports the best 1,000 models arising from the main model. The models are 
ordered according to their posterior model probabilities, so that the best model is the one on 
the left. The blue color indicates a positive coefficient, the red color indicates a negative 
coefficient, while the white color indicates that the variable is not included in the respective 
model. Figure 4 shows that most of the model mass includes variables that have a posterior 
inclusion probability (PIP) higher than 0.5. 
As a robustness check (detailed results are reported in Babecký et al., 2011) we have 
tested two alternative specifications with a fixed lag length set to 3 years and 6 years, 
respectively. The convergence is satisfactory as the correlation between the analytical and 
MC
3 PMPs is higher than 0.99 for both exercises. It is important to note that these results 
differ relative to the exact lag specification for each variable. Interestingly, variables 
belonging to the group of housing prices experience the largest drop in PIPs in the model with 
lags fixed at 3 years. When using the variables with a fixed lag of 6 years, only 11 of the 
potential variables have PIPs higher than 0.5. Notice that for this ultra long lag length, global 
variables turn out to be the most important in explaining crisis incidence. The development of 
global variables could thus be informative for crisis incidence even at the horizon of six years.  
4.3. Dynamic panel estimations 
As the last step, we re-estimate the model with the 23 indicators with PIP higher than 0.5 
(with exact lag for each indicator selected by PVAR) to obtain the marginal effect of each 
indicator, while controlling for all other indicators. We use GMM estimator to account for 
potential endogeneity. We opt for dynamic panel estimations since the dependent variable—
the CII—is time dependent. Given that crises are time-persistent, past realizations of the CII 
turn out to be significant determinants of the contemporaneous CII values according to our   18
BMA exercise. We set the lag of the CII variable on the righ-hand side equal to 4, 
consistently with the logic that an early warning must be issued at least one year ahead. 
Notice that our empirical specification has one important refinement compared to the existing 
studies. While it is common practice to use all available indicators, some of them being 
insignificant, we construct our model based on the pre-selected variables which are the 
outcome of the BMA. 
We start with a fixed effects specification as a natural benchmark for the panel 
framework. Nevertheless, since we employ a dynamic panel data model, the simple fixed 
effects estimator may deliver incorrect results. In dynamic panels the lagged dependent 
variable on the right-hand side is correlated with the error term; this is called dynamic panel 
bias (Nickell, 1981). Moreover, with the macroeconomic data we use, no regressors can be 
expected to be strictly exogenous, and the possible endogeneity should be taken into account. 
We treat all regressors as predetermined, because they enter the regression with lags 
(predetermined variables are independent of current disturbances but influenced by past ones).  
To tackle both the dynamic panel bias and the possible endogeneity of regressors, we 
employ the system generalized method-of-moments estimator (GMM) developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM is a refined version of the 
difference GMM (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991), allowing for greater 
estimation efficiency. Because our data set involves many time periods and regressors, we 
only use up to two lags of regressors as instruments and collapse the instrument sets to avoid 
proliferation of instruments. Moreover, because our data set is unbalanced, we use orthogonal 
deviations for the system GMM in order to maximize the sample size. It should be noted, 
however, that the dynamic panel bias dwindles with increasing time span of data, and with 
160 quarters in our data set the bias is likely to be quite small (Roodman, 2009). Also, the 
endogeneity problem should not be too serious since the shortest lag we use on the right-hand 
side of the regression is four quarters. Despite these caveats that point in favor of the simple 
fixed-effects model, we believe that the system GMM is a useful robustness check. 
As another sensitivity check, we allow for cross-country heterogeneity in the estimated 
parameters. Although our database only includes OECD and EU countries, and is thus 
substantially more homogeneous than the data set used by, for example, Rose and Spiegel 
(2009) and Frankel and Saravelos (2010) to explain crisis incidence, it would still be 
interesting to allow the coefficients on the individual warning indicators to vary across 
countries. To achieve that, we employ the mixed-effects multilevel estimator with random 
effects for each coefficient in the regression: 
CIIit = αi + (β + βi)CIIit-4 + (γ + γij)Xijt + δSkt + uit                   (5)   19
where βi and γij are country-specific, normally distributed random effects. Again, considering 
the large number of regressors, we have to collapse the number of coefficients to be estimated 
in the random-effects part of the specification. Therefore, we restrict all variances of random 
terms to be equal and all covariances to be zero. The resulting model is estimated by restricted 
maximum likelihood, which is more suitable for unbalanced panels than the usual generalized 
least squares method (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2009). The assumption underlying the 
aforementioned specification is that the random effects are uncorrelated with the remaining 
regressors. While this is a strong assumption, it is difficult to test in this setting. Thus, large 
differences between the results of the mixed-effects multilevel model and the simple fixed-
effects model may indicate either heterogeneity across countries in our sample or improper 
identification of the multilevel model. 
Another way of tackling the problem of possible country heterogeneity is to divide the 
countries into several groups and then run the simple fixed-effects regression separately for 
each group. A systematic method for dividing the countries into groups is clustering. The goal 
is to create groups of countries that may be expected to share similar slope coefficients in the 
early warning exercise. Because it is difficult (and arbitrary) to select one dimension that 
would define country similarity in this respect, we use all the variables in our data set that are 
available for all 40 countries (the variables are used in a standardized form so that every 
variable has the same weight). The common clustering method is the hierarchical approach, 
which begins with each country considered as one group, then continues with combining the 
closest two groups, and again—until one general group comprising all countries is formed.
  There are many methods for determining which groups are the closest ones, and 
therefore which groups should be merged at each step. One of the most appealing approaches 
is Ward’s method (Ward, 1963), which merges the two groups that lead to the minimum 
increase in the error sum of the squares of the differences across all dimensions; in this 
respect, Ward’s method is similar to ordinary least squares.  
 
Figure 5. Clusters of countries in our sample   20
 
 
The results of the clustering exercise are depicted in Figure 5, and it is readily apparent 
that two main groups of countries are formed. Despite a few exceptions, Group 2 consists 
primarily of large, developed countries (the ‘core’ of the OECD and the EU), while Group 1 
consists primarily of smaller or less developed countries. Countries inside these groups may 
be more homogeneous in terms of possible early warning indicators. Notice that although it is 
technically possible to form as many clusters as the number of countries in the sample, it is 
ultimately the researcher’s choice of the optimum number of clusters given the trade-off 
between the number of clusters and the degrees of freedom available for the estimations. We 
present results for two clusters in addition to the results for all countries.  
In our baseline specification the lags of the warning indicators are set upon the PVAR 
reported earlier; the results are reported in Table 1 and all three robustness checks (fixed 
effects, system GMM, and random coefficients) are broadly consistent with each other. The 
similarity of the estimated coefficients obtained by alternative methods suggests that the 
potential endogeneity of the regressors is not likely to be an issue. In addition, it should be 
noted that the signs of all the estimated coefficients are consistent in the panel and the BMA 
estimation as well as in the impulse response function (at the selected horizon) from the 
PVAR. This also rebuts the issue of potential omission bias in the bivariate PVAR. In fact, the 
examination of the impulse responses upon the PVAR brings extra information on how the 
effects of each selected variable change over time (from ‘ultra early warning’ to ‘late   21
warning’). The main differences in the results of the specifications reported in Table 1 emerge 
between the two clusters of countries. While residential capital formation is important for 
Cluster 1, it is not important for Cluster 2 (the ‘core’ countries). The worldwide inflow of FDI 
and trade is a significant warning indicator of crisis incidence for the core countries, but not 
for the countries included in Cluster 1. The same applies for the money market rate, domestic 
private credit, the term spread, aggregate asset prices, and the nominal effective exchange 
rate. On the other hand, M3 is important for the countries in Cluster 1, but not for the core 















































































































































s1  -0.0541 0.00913 -0.0735 -0.365
* 0.126 
s2 0.137  0.157
*** 0.134  0.0440 0.247
* 




* 0.132  -0.333
*** 
Observations  3558 3558 3558 1360 2198 
                                                 
7 It may be argued that a warning four quarters before the crisis (for some variables) is not sufficiently ‘early’. 
For this reason, we also provide results of the model where all the lags of the warning indicators are set to three 
years (Babecký et al., 2011, Table 2). Similarly to the previous case, we first run the BMA exercise and only 
select variables with an inclusion probability higher than 50%. Once again, the results of our robustness checks 
are consistent with the results of BMA. Because we model crisis incidence for the real economy, we also provide 
the results of an ‘ultra early-warning’ exercise where all lags of the indicator variables are set to six years. It is 
interesting to note that global variables are especially important in this case (Babecký et al., 2011, Table 3).   22
Countries  38 38    19 19 
R-squared  0.371    0.399  0.377 
Note:
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. Response variable: hp_cii. We select lag length using PVAR and only 
include variables with inclusion probability from BMA higher than 50%. 
 
4.4. Assessment of model performance 
In the next step we construct an Early Warning Index (EWI) from the fitted values of our 
model. We select the random coefficients model for this exercise and also add the extracted 
random effects to the estimated slope coefficients for each country; consequently, the index 
becomes country-specific. The EWI in quarter t can be interpreted as the prediction of crisis 
incidence for quarter t observed one year before. 
To take a country-specific example, Figure 6 illustrates the in-sample fit of the EWI 
for the United States. The EWI is compared against a simple autoregressive function of the 
CII; it is readily apparent that the additional indicators included in the EWI significantly 
improve the prediction accuracy. The figures for other countries, available in Babecký et al. 
(2011), allow for similar inference. The EWI was able to predict quite precisely the incidence 
of all major US recessions across the last 40 years. However, it partially failed to predict the 
magnitude of the 1973–75 and 1982 recessions. A possible explanation is that the causes of 
these crises (the first oil shock and the Vietnam War for the former one, and the second oil 
shock and monetary policy tightening for the latter one) were too different from the rest of the 
sample. 
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While the in-sample fit of the EWI is satisfactory, the out-of-sample performance of 
the model may be quite different. We conduct a pseudo-out-of-sample forecasting exercise 
and focus on the recent crisis. The model is re-estimated using data till 2007Q1, which means 
well before the real economy began to feel the latest crisis. The results for all specifications 
are summarized in Table 2; most variables hold their signs and only a few have now lost their 
statistical significance. To be specific, it appears that foreign liabilities, residential capital 
formation, oil prices, and world trade were more important predictors for the recent crisis than 
for previous crises in our data set. 
  Out-of-sample forecasting performance is not the focus of this paper, because, among 
other things, some of the variables included in the EWI are not available in real time and thus 
cannot be used for forecasting. The purpose of the following exercise is merely to show that 
our model can be expected to perform better than a naïve estimate, the simple autoregressive 
process of the CII. The pseudo-out-of-sample forecast for the case of the United States is 
depicted in Figure 7.
8 Even out-of-sample, the model is able to capture the beginning of the 
crisis in the real economy in 2008 and predicts the magnitude of the crisis quite well, as 
opposed to the simple autoregressive function of the CII. The picture is similar for other 
countries (reported in Babecký et al., 2011). In all cases the EWI seems to perform better than 
the simple autoregressive function.  
 














































** 0.115 0.0738  0.199
*** 







L5.st_foreignliab 0.0763  0.00263  0.101 0.235
* -0.0276 




























* 0.125 -0.101  0.155
** 
                                                 
8 Note that the selection of variables is performed taking into account the whole sample. A proper out-of-sample 
forecast would require both the selection and the estimation to be performed only on the pre-2007Q1 part of the 
sample.    24






























*** 0.136  0.0989 0.248
* 
s3  0.0903 0.0712 0.0459 -0.0657 0.182 
_cons -0.201
** -0.248
*** -0.133  0.0447 -0.351
*** 
Observations  3015 3015 3015 1086 1929 
Countries  38 38    19 19 
R-squared  0.318    0.305  0.343 
Note:
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
Response variable: hp_cii. We select lag length using PVAR and only include variables with inclusion probability from 
BMA higher than 50%. 
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5. Tentative Inputs into the Macroprudential Policy Debate 
In this section, we outline how the continuous EWM can be used in the macroprudential 
policy debate. First and the most importantly, the EWM can be used to identify the main 
sources of risk. As a result, policy makers could incorporate the useful early warning 
indicators identified by the EWM into their risk dashboards (Trichet et al., 2011). Second, one 
could look at the out-of-sample forecasts of CII as we presented above. According to our 
definition of the early warning indicator, the minimum time lag considered is four quarters. 
Therefore, the CII cannot be predicted for more than one year ahead. Third, potential policy 
responses to early warnings could be assessed in PVAR framework. However, since due to   25
data limitations this implies limiting the country coverage, we do not pursue this strategy 
either (see Babecký et al., 2011 for some preliminary results). 
In order to identify the major sources of risk, we look closely at the explanatory power 
of the useful leading indicators selected by BMA. To make the analysis easier to follow, we 
use the division of the indicators into groups, which are meant to represent distinct areas from 
which a risk or a signal of potential crisis could originate, such as the banking system, capital 
markets, and global variables. We use the baseline specification (fixed effects) and in Figure 8 
we report the results for each group of variables. In addition, in the right pie chart we provide 
the percentages for the individual variables within the most important group, global variables. 
 
Figure 8. Contributions of individual groups of indicators to prediction of CII 
 
Note: Shares in the model’s R-squared (0.37); based on fixed effects regression reported in Table 1. 
 
The percentages in Figure 8 denote the groups’ shares in the model’s R-squared, 
which is equal to 0.37. The most important groups of potential indicators are global variables 
(38%), domestic housing prices (17%) and domestic debts and savings (10%). Taken 
together, these groups comprise about 2/3 of the model’s R-squared, which means about 30% 
of the total variance in the CII. On the other hand, indicators related to capital market 
situation or external balance, seem to be of little importance. 
It follows that regarding the sources of risk, it pays off for macroprudential policy to 
watch global variables and housing prices, since they represent economic segments that are 










































We provided a critical review of the early warning literature and proposed a model reflecting 
some common problems of the previous contributions. In particular, we created a continuous 
EWM for crisis incidence, which characterizes the real costs of crises for the economy. As the 
basis for our analysis, we collected a dataset for 40 developed countries, including the EU-27 
group, over 1970–2010 at quarterly frequency. This approach fills a gap in the early warning 
literature, which has so far mainly focused on either panel data sets comprising developing 
economies or large heterogeneous cross-sections. 
We tracked the economic crises by the means of the continuous crisis incidence index 
that measures the real cost of crises to the economy in terms of output and employment loss 
and fiscal deficit. Using the set of 50 potential leading indicators we identified the 
determinants of crisis incidence using estimation techniques which are novel in the empirical 
literature on early warning. First, we relaxed the typical assumption of a fixed horizon at 
which the early warning signals come. We tested for the optimal lag length employing a panel 
VAR framework and examine the impulse responses of crisis incidence and its potential 
leading indicators. Second, we applied Bayesian model averaging in order to identify useful 
leading indicators out of the total of 50 collected potential indicators. Third, we used panel 
estimation techniques (including dynamic estimations and system GMM) to assess the 
determinants of crisis incidence. We dealt with sample heterogeneity by employing the 
random coefficient model and illustrate the stability of coefficients among endogenously 
determined clusters. Finally, we assessed the models’ performance in terms of in-sample and 
out-of-sample fit. 
Our key results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that crisis incidence 
warning signals come at various horizons. We classify those horizons into early warning (one 
to three years), late warning (less than one year), and ultra early warning (more than three 
years). We argue that it is important to account for the time lags of potential leading 
indicators when building an early warning model. The way economic indicators develop prior 
to the crisis depends on the horizon chosen. For example, we find that a strengthening of the 
domestic currency increases crisis incidence in four years (hence currency appreciation could 
issue an ‘ultra early warning’ signal), while the domestic currency depreciates just several 
quarters prior to an observed increase in crisis incidence (a ‘too late warning’). Thus, timely 
policy reactions could mitigate crisis incidence. Next, we find that historical decomposition 
provides useful information on the sources of crisis incidence, in particular national versus   27
global factors. Regarding national factors, we find in particular that decreasing housing prices 
signal an important risk for macroeconomic stability five quarters ahead. Global variables 
signal another substantial risk 1.5 to 3.5 years ahead depending on the specific variable. In the 
presence of global risks, national policies are unlikely to be an efficient tool to cope with 
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ANNEX I. Data 
 
I.1. List of countries 
 
 No.  Country  EU  OECD 
1  Australia    OECD 
2  Austria  EU  OECD 
3  Belgium  EU  OECD 
4  Bulgaria  EU   
5  Canada    OECD 
6  Cyprus  EU   
7  Czech Republic  EU  OECD 
8  Denmark  EU  OECD 
9  Estonia  EU  OECD 
10  Finland  EU  OECD 
11  France  EU  OECD 
12  Germany  EU  OECD 
13  Greece  EU  OECD 
14  Hungary  EU  OECD 
15  Chile    OECD 
16  Iceland    OECD 
17  Ireland  EU  OECD 
18  Israel    OECD 
19  Italy  EU  OECD 
20  Japan    OECD 
21  Korea    OECD 
22  Latvia  EU   
23  Lithuania  EU   
24  Luxembourg  EU  OECD 
25  Malta  EU   
26  Mexico    OECD 
27  Netherlands  EU  OECD 
28  New Zealand    OECD 
29  Norway    OECD 
30  Poland  EU  OECD 
31  Portugal  EU  OECD 
32  Romania  EU   
33  Slovakia  EU  OECD 
34  Slovenia  EU  OECD 
35  Spain  EU  OECD 
36  Sweden  EU  OECD 
37  Switzerland    OECD 
38  Turkey    OECD 
39  United Kingdom  EU  OECD 





I.2. Groups of variables 
 
No. Groups 
CII  Crises Incidence Index 
G1 Monetary  policy  stance 
G2 Interest  rates 
G3  Banking system situation 
G4 Capital  market  situation 
G5  Money and credit 
G6  Debts and savings 
G7 External  debt 
G8 Housing  prices 
G9 Real  economy 
G10 Fiscal  stance 
G11 External  balance 
G12 Global  variables 
 
I.3. Variables, transformations, and data sources 
 
 No.  Group 
Sign in 
the group 
average:   






level (l)   Code Variable  Source 
1  CII  0  g   rgdp  GDP, real, seasonally adjusted, HP-filtered gap  IMF IFS  
2  CII 0  l  govtbalance  Government  balance, per cent of GDP, HP-filtered gap  NIGEM 
3  CII 1  l  unemployment 
Unemployment rate (% of labor force), seasonally adjusted, 
HP-filtered gap  IMF IFS  
4  G1  0  g  neer  Nominal effective exchange rate  IMF IFS  
5  G1  1  g  m1  M1  IMF IFS  
6  G1  0  l  mmrate  Money market interest rate  IMF IFS  
7  G2  0  l  lenrate  Interest rate on credit  IMF IFS  
8  G2  0  l  deprate  Deposit interest rate  IMF IFS  
9  G2  0  l  govtbond  Long-term bond yield, nominal  IMF IFS  
10  G3  0  l  termspread  Spread (long-term bond yield minus short-term interest rate)  IMF IFS  
11  G3  0  l  debtcreditspread  Deposit-credit spread   IMF IFS  
12  G3  0  l  bankcapratio  Banking sector capital ratio  WDI 
13  G3  0  l  bankliqratio  Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%)  WDI 
14  G3  1  l  nonperfloans  Bank non-performing loans (% of loans, 2006)  WDI 
15  G4 1  l  mktcap  Stock  market  capitalization  NIGEM 
16  G4  1  g  shareprice  Stock market index  IMF IFS  
17  G4 1  l  equityreturns  Equity market returns  IMF IFS  
18  G5  1  g  m2  M2  IMF IFS  
19  G5  1  g  m3  M3  IMF IFS  
20  G5 1  l  domprivcredit  Domestic  private sector credit (% of GDP, 2006)  WDI 
21  G6  1  l  govtdebt  Government debt (% of GDP)  NIGEM 
22  G6  1  g  hhdebt  Gross liabilities of personal sector  NIGEM 
23  G6  0  l  netsavings  Net national savings (% of GNI)  WDI 
24  G6 0  l  grosssavings  Gross  national savings (% of GDP)  WDI 
25  G7  1  g  foreignliab  Gross foreign liabilities  NIGEM 
26  G7  0  l  nfa  Net external position (% of GDP, 2004)  IMF 
27  G7 1  l  foreigndebt  Foreign  debt/GDP  (%)  WDI 
28  G8 1  l  residcapform  Private  residential fixed capital formation  OECD 
29  G8  1  g  houseprices  House price index 
a 
30  G8 1  g  aggassetprices  Nominal aggregate asset price index 
a 
31  G9  1 l  indprodch  Percentage change in industrial production  IMF IFS  
32  G9  1  g  hhcons  Private final consumption expenditure  IMF IFS    33
33  G9  1  g  capform  Gross total fixed capital formation  IMF IFS  
34  G9 1  l  indshare  Industry  share  WDI 
35  G9 1  l  servshare Services  share  WDI 
36  G9  1  l  trade  Trade (% of GDP)  WDI 
37  G10  1  g  govtcons  Government consumption  IMF IFS  
38  G10  0  l  taxburden  Total tax burden  OECD 
39  G11  0  g  curaccount_ifs  Current account  IMF IFS  
40  G11  0  g  trbalance  Trade balance  IMF IFS  
41  G11  0  g  reer  Real effective exchange rate index  IMF IFS  
42  G11  1  l  fdiinflow  FDI net inflows (% of GDP)  WDI 
43  G11  1  l  fdioutflow  FDI net outflows (% of GDP)  WDI 
44  G12  1  l  termsoftrade  Terms of trade  IMF IFS  
45  G12 1  g  wrgdp  Global GDP
b  NIGEM 
46  G12 1  g  wtrade  Global  trade  NIGEM 
47  G12  1  l  winf  Global inflation  IMF IFS  
48  G12  1  l  wbankcredit  Global credit (% of GDP)  IMF IFS  
49  G12  1  l  wcreditpriv  Global domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  WDI 
50  G12  1  l  wfdiinflow  Global FDI inflow (% of GDP)  UNCTAD 
51  G12  1  g  wexpprice  Global export prices  IMF IFS  
52  v1  1  l  inflation  Consumer price inflation (%)   IMF IFS  
53  v2 0  g  comprice 
Commodity prices (we take crude oil petroleum, high 
correlation)  IMF IFS  
Note: 
a Global Property Guide (www.globalpropertyguide.com) and BIS calculations based on national data. 
b  Although country-specific GDP enters the composition of the CII, the use of global GDP among the 
explanatory variables should not cause significant endogeneity bias since each country’s weight in global GDP 






 ANNEX II.  Bayesian model averaging 
II.1. Detailed results for each potential predictor 
 
Table A1. Dynamic BMA with lags set upon PVAR 
   PIP  Post Mean  Post SD   Pos. Sign 
Crisis Incidence Index      
hp_cii_L4  1.000 0.315 0.017 1.000 
Monetary policy stance      
st_neer_L12 0.927  0.184 0.065 1.000 
st_m1_L12  0.009 0.000 0.006 0.994 
st_mmrate_L13  0.989 0.224 0.057 1.000 
Interest rates             
st_lenrate_L13  0.023 0.003 0.025 1.000 
st_deprate_L14  0.010 0.001 0.009 1.000 
st_govtbond_L15  0.065 -0.008  0.034 0.000 
Banking system situation             
st_termspread_L7 0.951 -0.142  0.051 0.000 
st_debtcreditspread_L13  0.145 -0.015  0.039 0.000 
st_bankcapratio_L13 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.173 
st_bankliqratio_L13 0.017 0.001 0.009 1.000 
st_nonperfloans_L8  0.006 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Capital market situation             
st_mktcap_L5  0.078 -0.010  0.040 0.000 
st_shareprice_L5  0.154 -0.023  0.059 0.000 
st_equityreturns_L4  1.000 -0.354  0.052 0.000 
Money and credit             
st_m2_L8  0.344 0.044 0.066 1.000 
st_m3_L4  0.880 -0.133  0.065 0.000 
st_domprivcredit_L9  0.967 0.137 0.045 1.000 
Debts and savings             
st_govtdebt_L4  0.569 -0.093  0.091 0.000 
st_hhdebt_L11  0.010 0.001 0.007 1.000 
st_netsavings_L5  0.013 0.001 0.012 0.938 
st_grosssavings_L4 0.942 -0.171  0.064 0.000 
External debt             
st_foreignliab_L5  1.000 -0.215  0.040 0.000 
st_nfa_L8  0.161 -0.015  0.038 0.000 
st_foreigndebt_L4  0.005 0.000 0.003 0.993 
Housing prices             
st_residcapform_L5  1.000 -0.253  0.043 0.000 
st_houseprices_L5  1.000 -0.377  0.045 0.000 
st_aggassetprices_L5  0.935 -0.209  0.076 0.000 
Real economy             
st_indprodch_L4  0.016 -0.001  0.008 0.000 
st_hhcons_L4  0.012 -0.001  0.007 0.000 
st_capform_L4  0.086 -0.007  0.027 0.000 
st_indshare_L15  0.006 0.000 0.005 0.363 
st_servshare_L15  0.006 0.000 0.006 0.651   35
st_trade_L10  0.996 0.245 0.061 1.000 
Fiscal stance             
st_govtcons_L4  0.172 0.015 0.037 1.000 
st_taxburden_L6  0.005 0.000 0.002 0.975 
External balance             
st_curaccount_ifs_L4  0.117 0.011 0.033 1.000 
st_trbalance_L4  0.811 0.098 0.057 1.000 
st_reer_L12  0.085 0.014 0.049 1.000 
st_fdiinflow_L5  0.011 -0.001  0.007 0.000 
st_fdioutflow_L6  0.157 -0.016  0.041 0.000 
Global variables             
st_termsoftrade_L12 0.998 0.209 0.050 1.000 
st_wrgdp_L4  1.000 -0.653  0.081 0.000 
st_wtrade_L4  0.599 0.102 0.094 1.000 
st_winf_L14  1.000 0.270 0.057 1.000 
st_wcreditpriv_L8  1.000 -0.433  0.067 0.000 
st_wfdiinflow_L6  0.998 0.251 0.060 1.000 
st_wexpprice_L4  1.000 0.191 0.042 1.000 
Inflation             
st_inflation_L16  0.006 0.000 0.004 0.279 
Commodity prices             
st_comprice_L10  1.000 -0.388  0.065 0.000 
Note: Coefficients in bold type have posterior inclusion probability higher than 0.5 
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 ANNEX III. Contents of online appendix available at http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/en/node/372  
 
Detailed results for 40 countries: 
CII_model_fit\        - plots of in-sample and out-of-sample model fit  
CII_plots\         - plots of the CII  
COI_model_fit\       - plots of in-sample and out-of-sample model fit  
COI_plots\       - plots of the COI 
 
Panel VAR impulse responses for the whole panel of 40 countries: 
Optimal_lags_PVAR\   - plots of bivariate (CII, each predictor) PVAR impulse 
responses for lag selection (note: hp_cii_neg is the CII, 
st_XX is leading indicator XX) 
Policy_simulations_PVAR\  - plots of bivariate (CII/EWI, each policy variable) 
PVAR impulse responses for assessment of CII/EWI 
response to each policy variable (note: hp_cii_neg is the 
CII, EWI is the EWI, st_YY is policy variable YY) 
 
Anonymized database of crises (Crisis Occurrence Index, COI), details provided in Babecký 
et al. (2011): 
CDEC40_40_AT_LEAST_TWO.xls   Crisis occurrence = 1 if at least two of the sources agree 
on the occurrence of a crisis (e.g. a country expert and 
at least one research paper, or at least two research 
papers); 0 otherwise  
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